1	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF NEVADA
2	BEFORE THE HONORABLE GLORIA M. NAVARRO, DISTRICT JUDGE000
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4	UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, :
5	Plaintiff, : No. 2:16-cr-100-GMN-CWH
6	-vs- : October 9, 2018
7	JAN ROUVEN FUECHTENER, : Las Vegas, Nevada
8	Defendant. :
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11	TRANSCRIPT OF MOTION HEARING
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13	APPEARANCES:
14	FOR THE PLAINTIFF: ELHAM ROOHANI Assistant United States Attorney
15	Las Vegas, Nevada
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17	FOR THE DEFENDANT: RICHARD SCHONFELD and ROBERT DeMARCO
18	Attorneys at Law Las Vegas, Nevada
19	Has Veyas, Nevaua
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23	Transcribed by: Margaret E. Griener, CCR #3, FCRR Official Reporter
24	400 South Virginia Street Reno, Nevada 89501
25	Reno, Nevada 09301

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LAS VEGAS, NEVADA, TUESDAY, OCTOBER 9, 2018, 2:51 P.M.
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                               This is the time set for the motion
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                   THE CLERK:
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     hearing regarding document number 296, the motion for
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     reconsideration of order number 295, in case
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     2:16-cr-100-GMN-CWH, United States of America versus Jan
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     Rouven Fuechtener.
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                   Counsel, please make your appearances for the
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     record.
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                   MS. ROOHANI: Good afternoon, your Honor.
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     Roohani for the United States.
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                   THE COURT: Good afternoon, Ms. Roohani.
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                   MR. SCHONFELD: Good afternoon, your Honor.
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     Richard Schonfeld and Robert DeMarco specially appearing for
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     the defendant who is present in custody.
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                   THE COURT: Good afternoon. So what is
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     specially appearing?
                   MR. SCHONFELD: Your Honor, we filed the motion
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     for release of funds for the purpose of retaining our office
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     to represent the defendant as outlined in that motion, but
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     until we actually -- until he has the ability to retain us as
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     counsel, we were not and still are not in a position to make a
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     full general appearance on his behalf.
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                   THE COURT: And is Ms. Connolly present today?
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MS. ROOHANI: Your Honor, Ms. Connolly is not present. I spoke with her yesterday. She had indicated to me that she, one, was not able to appear today, she had a hearing in family court at 2:15 p.m.

She also felt it would not be appropriate for her to appear here in light of the proceedings that have occurred thus far, as well as the fact that this is not her motion, and she has no position on it, and doesn't feel like she can have a position on it.

And so it's my understanding that she is not intending to appear today.

THE COURT: And, Mr. Fuechtener, do you want me to waive the appearance of your attorney, Ms. Connolly, or do you want me to continue this for a different date so that Ms. Connolly can be here? Because I was not aware that she had a conflict.

THE DEFENDANT: It would be okay for me to waive her appearance.

THE COURT: Okay. All right.

Well, so the motion that's made by the law firm of Chesnoff & Schonfeld refers to the Supreme Court case -- I'm starting at the bottom of my list of questions instead of at the top -- $Luis\ v\ U.S.$, but the question in that case was whether a pretrial restraint of funds was appropriate.

We didn't have that here. Mr. Fuechtener had

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access to his funds pretrial, and he hired various different attorneys before and during trial.

And it was not until after he entered a plea of guilty, and the Court accepted his plea of guilty, that as a result of him agreeing in that plea of guilty to the amount that was going to be forfeited, that the government moved for that amount to be seized in order to preserve it so that it wouldn't be spent or wasted, and the Court did grant that motion.

So I'm not sure that the *Luis* case really applies at all to this situation. It seems to be just the opposite.

But the defense also states that it looks like at this point there's only 14 of the -- there was like 90 something potential victims that have actually come forward with a formal restitution request.

You know, the sentencing statutes provide them up to 60 days after sentencing to come forward, and specifically in these kind of cases, unfortunately what happens is a lot of these victims, they receive letter after letter after letter advising them under the laws because they're required to be notified every time that their images are found by law enforcement, and it takes quite awhile for them to go through these.

Some of the victims who appear quite regularly

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have retained attorneys who have staff that go through those envelopes that they receive multiple a month, and some people just don't.

So I don't know who these victims are specifically, and whether they're the kind of person who would only receive one envelope a year or if it's the kind of victim -- I'm thinking of, like, the Vickie and Amys that receive several, and it takes their staff months to go through.

And yet this case has been around for quite some time, since 2016, and has received some notoriety because of Mr. Fuechtener's professional employment and celebrity status.

So the amount that the defense claims for -- is likely for potential restitution at this point, if the number remains at 14 victims, times 5,000, because that's what was agreed to in the plea agreement, is the 70,000, the potential assessments is 10,200, and then the statutory fines, potential statutory fines, the maximum is 500,000.

MS. ROOHANI: And, your Honor, I actually do need to correct that. The mandatory restitution under the Justice for Victims of Trafficking Act is \$15,000 because he pled guilty to three counts.

I understand that there is a second motion to withdraw the guilty plea on the basis that the counts are duplicative. Of course, it's the government's position that

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they are not duplicative.

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So it's our position that the amount under the JVCA, Justice for Victims of Trafficking Act, is \$15,000 plus \$300 of the special assessment. The statutory fine range is \$750,000 for the three counts, but the guidelines range is 50,000 to \$500,000.

And so because the government was not intending to ask for the statutory maximum amount for the purposes of the fine, that's why we limited it to 500,000 which would be the potential high end of the guideline range.

So that is why the amount was five -- requested was \$500,000 and not \$750,000, and a certain amount of money was returned to Mr. Fuechtener as a result of that.

And I recognize that we have a difference of opinion, let's say, with the defense regarding those amounts. However, based upon the existence of the current plea agreement without your Honor's ruling on the second motion to withdraw the guilty plea, that is how it stands currently.

Your Honor, and I believe you are absolutely correct. There are 92 identified victims. Your Honor is correct that they are entitled to continue to seek restitution up through sentencing and statutorily even after sentencing for a certain period of time.

I can represent to your Honor from the time the original PSR was written in this case back in early 2017, to

withdraw the guilty plea, three, for the purposes of

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sentencing, four, for the appeal, and, five, for a potential 2255.

I explained to Mr. Schonfeld and Mr. Chesnoff that the case law did not support any funds being released under the Sixth Amendment for the appeal on the 2255, and I can explain that further, your Honor.

But also in terms of the trial, if they were successful in a motion to withdraw the guilty plea, the United States has already conceded early at the time before Judge Hoffman that if we don't have a conviction, we don't have a legal basis to retain these funds.

So I asked Mr. Schonfeld and Chesnoff to essentially carve out the additional amounts for the trial amount, the appeal amount, and the 2255 amount because it would be our position that although Luis, I agree with you, your Honor, is probably not applicable here, first of all, it's a forfeiture case, second of all, it's a pretrial restraint of untainted funds, and I'll go through that in just a moment.

They graciously came back with a number, and they told us \$175,000, but they could not assure me that that did not include an amount for appeal.

And so I did a little bit of research, your

Honor. In *United States versus Marshall*, in 2017, the Fourth

Circuit specifically held or explained that the Supreme Court

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has never held the defendants enjoy the right to counsel of choice on appeal, and that's because defendants have no federal constitutional right to an appeal, they only have a statutory right to an appeal, therefore the defendant can't invoke the Sixth Amendment to have funds set aside for the purposes of appeal.

As your Honor is also aware, defendant has no right to counsel whatsoever for the purposes of a 2255, let alone counsel of his choice, or appointed counsel.

So at a bare minimum those two things must be carved out. There's no legal basis to release the funds for that purpose, and, in fact, it would result in a manifest injustice to the victims and also potentially the United States and the court if we were going to be seeking money for the purpose of a fine.

And, your Honor, if you'll allow me to, I'm going to use the ELMO just because I made a visual aid and now I want to use it so --

THE COURT: Okay.

MS. ROOHANI: Your Honor, the original case that dealt with this was Kaplan versus Drysdale, it was a Supreme Court case in 1989. The money was sought for services that would be rendered through the time of sentencing.

In that case, it dealt with tainted assets. And I note, your Honor, that all of these cases deal with

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forfeiture, not restitution and fines. So to some degree none of these cases are instructive, but because the defendants have cited this, this is sort of why I'm going down this train of thought.

Those dealt with tainted assets, and the defendant had already pled guilty pursuant to a plea agreement.

In that case, the law firm actually sued the United States seeking a release of the forfeited funds to be able to pay themselves back for the services that they had already rendered, and the Court had said no, there's no Sixth Amendment right to -- because it was tainted funds, the rights had already vested in the United States and it was postconviction.

Then we get to 2016, which is Luis, this is the case that the defendants have cited. In that case, as your Honor as noted, this was a pretrial restraint of untainted funds. In that case the Court held that there was, in fact, a Sixth Amendment right, and therefore the Court held -- and I'll quote the language for your Honor,

"The defendant has a right to use his innocent property to pay a reasonable fee for the assistance of counsel."

And then the Court explained the courts must determine reasonable attorney's fees under the Equal Access to

Justice Act, which is 28 United States Code section 2412(d)(2)(A).

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Then, your Honor, interpreting both Kaplan and Luis, we have both the Fourth and Fifth Circuit which probably is the closest to what we have here. In both of those cases the defendants had wanted money for the purposes of their appeal. It was untainted funds much like it is here. It was postconviction after they had already pled guilty or had been convicted, and both of those courts said that there was no Sixth Amendment right.

Now, applying that guidance to Mr. Fuechtener's case, your Honor, you note here that the motion to withdraw the guilty plea, again, all of the assets are untainted, and the government would concede that, because they are for the basis of restitution and fines and not for the basis of forfeiture.

As to his first request, although it is postconviction and plea, it's not entirely clear based upon this line of cases what the result would be, same as with for the purposes of sentencing, and I'll come back to that in just a moment, your Honor.

In terms of trial which is what I've already indicated, is if the plea is withdrawn, then *Luis* would hypothetically control because there would be a pretrial restraint of untainted funds.

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With regard to the appeal, Marshall and Scully from the Fourth and Fifth Circuit would control saying that there's no Sixth Amendment right, and therefore there's no basis to release those funds, and then in terms of the 2255, there's no right to counsel at all.

So we're sort of left in this question mark

phase regarding the first request for the motion to withdraw

and the second for the purposes of sentencing.

And, your Honor, as you're aware, the United States tries to make things as clear as possible for the purposes of appeal. We certainly don't want this case to be sent back on the basis of the denial of a Sixth Amendment right to counsel.

Therefore, in speaking with Mr. Schonfeld and Mr. Chesnoff, we would agree that at most \$175,000 should be released, but that has to be only for the purposes of a new motion to withdraw the guilty plea, if any, and, second, for the purposes of sentencing.

My additional concern, your Honor, is for the purposes of appeal. We would ask you make specific findings under Luis, one, that these are untainted funds, two, that it was postconviction, and, three, we would ask that you engage in a reasonable analysis under the Equal Access to Justice Act.

Now, my concern, your Honor, is a little bit of

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sticker shock when I hear that number of 300,000 and then
     175,000. I'm concerned because under the EAJA it specifically
     states that attorney's fees shall not be awarded in excess of
     $125 per hour unless the Court specifically determines that an
     increase in the cost of living or a special factor such as a
     limited availability of qualified attorneys for the
    proceedings involved would justify a higher fee.
                   So if your Honor would be inclined to do that,
     we would ask that you make specific findings and make the
     appellate record clear in the event that the Ninth Circuit
     decides to review this.
                   And, your Honor, I'm happy to answer any
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     questions that you may have either about Luis, about Kaplan or
     about Marshall.
                   THE COURT:
                               So the $175,000 would be to cover
     the motion that is claiming double jeopardy?
                   MS. ROOHANI: I'm not sure what that motion
     would be, your Honor, and you would have to inquire from
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     defense counsel about that.
                   THE COURT: All right. So potentially a new
    motion.
                   MS. ROOHANI: Absolutely, it would be a new
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    motion, your Honor.
                   THE COURT: And then it would also be to cover
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    sentencing?
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agreed to pay them.

MS. ROOHANI: And an appeal. And that's my concern is I strongly urge the Court to carve out any amount for the purposes of appeal because we are attempting to protect -- and typically, your Honor, I think this is -- what's important is the United States typically wouldn't take a position, but I have some type of moral ethical obligation to the victims of the defendant's crimes to preserve as much money as humanly possible.

And there is entirely the possibility that we have 92 currently identified victims, but we may identify more victims of the 9,000 videos on the defendant's devices by the

And so, your Honor, I would ask that you, at a bare minimum, ask defense counsel whether it would just apply to the motion to withdraw and sentencing, or also appeal, and, if it would apply to appeal, to carve out the amount for appeal because he has no Sixth Amendment right to that.

time of sentencing, and so that is money that should also be

available to those victims because the defendant has already

THE COURT: And your display had a blank for whether the funds should apply to sentencing pursuant to Luis, but that's also not a pretrial --

MS. ROOHANI: Agreed, your Honor, absolutely.

THE COURT: Pursuant to section 3673 of

Title 18, the term "found guilty" includes acceptance by a

court of a plea of guilty as well as adjudication by a jury.

MS. ROOHANI: And, your Honor, I agree with you

100 percent. I just don't think that *Luis* is the right case.

The problem is, is that I don't know that we have the right case in our arsenal right now to sort of deal with this problem.

And so to the extent that the defense is relying on Luis, we're trying to appeal-proof this, if you will, and if you were inclined to apply Luis, at least Kaplan and really its progeny and everything that's grown out of Kaplan, I think that there's a question mark there, and in light of the question mark, we would submit that if you were going to apply Luis, that would be the correct analysis.

And to be clear, your Honor, I don't disagree with you. I think that you are correct. I don't think Luis is the right -- I don't think Luis helps the defendant at all, in fact, it probably helps the government more than it helps the defendant because it is a pretrial restraint in that case whereas here it's a postconviction restraint.

THE COURT: All right.

MS. ROOHANI: And, your Honor, Mr. Smith just brought me the math because I can't do it in my head. It seems \$175,000 would amount to 1400 hours of legal work at \$125 an hour, which would -- to justify that we would have to push out sentencing approximately six months, and, of course,

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     I'm not inclined to agree to that especially in light of the
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     procedural history of this case and the fact that the United
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     States Attorney's office has been dealing with this case since
     January of 2016.
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                   THE COURT: All right.
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                   MS. ROOHANI: With your permission, I'll sit
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     down unless you have additional questions, your Honor, thank
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     you.
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                   THE COURT:
                               That's good.
                                             Thank you.
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                   All right. Mr. Schonfeld?
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                   MR. SCHONFELD: Yes, your Honor.
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                   THE COURT:
                               I know you're not quite as
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     acquainted with this case as I am. I have essentially heard
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     practically the entire trial because it was not until the very
     last government witness testified, especially Agent Panovich
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     who is here, that the parties decided that it was appropriate
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     to have a plea for the Court's consideration.
                   So since then we've had multiday evidentiary
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     hearings with multiple attorneys testifying about the
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     intricacies of representation.
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                   And I have said this looks like a little bit of
     a desperate move on behalf of the defendant at this point, and
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     I'm not really persuaded by the double jeopardy argument, so I
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     don't know what other arguments you could raise in another
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motion for new trial.

But I am going to provide some funds out of the seized funds, but only a reasonable amount, because I'm also not sure that more victims are not going to come forward. I think we will see more victims, but perhaps not to the extent that it would necessitate the Court continuing to retain all of the funds.

So do you have a breakdown for me about -- the 175,000 is represented to be for the motion, the sentencing and the appeal.

MR. SCHONFELD: Here's what it is, your Honor.

We were quite clear with the government and wanted to let them know that it did include the appeal, and I'll explain why.

So what we told them the defendant would be willing to do in order to satisfy this motion and satisfy his right to counsel of choice for purposes of the potential motion to withdraw the guilty plea and the sentencing is \$125,000 for attorney's fees and \$50,000 for costs.

Obviously I won't go into privileged communication, but there are a lot of costs that would be involved with preparing for sentencing in the way that we would want to prepare for a sentencing.

As to the fee, we advised the government that we are not in a position to agree to become counsel of record for the defendant only for purposes of a potential motion to withdraw the guilty plea and sentencing, and the basis for

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that is that once a sentencing concludes, we have an obligation on behalf of the defendant, if he directs us to do so, to file the notice of appeal within a very short time frame. So we would have to file that notice of appeal.

Once we file that notice of appeal, we are then counsel of record both in the district court and in the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.

If we haven't been retained for that purpose, we would then have to file a motion to withdraw as counsel of record in both courts, hope that it gets granted, but, in the meantime, there are also deadlines that come up very quickly once the notice of appeal was filed so that we would have to do requests for transcripts, designate transcripts, and other matters related to the appeal.

So we are just unwilling to take on that responsibility without being retained for that purpose.

I understand the government's argument. I have just seen the case citations for the first time. So assuming, but not agreeing that they are correct, that defendant is not entitled to counsel of choice on appeal, I would understand where that is coming from if they're accurate, however, our office would be unwilling to take on that responsibility if we weren't retained for that purpose.

And so that's why we did break the fee down to the periods where we felt that we could commit as counsel of

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record. Two out of the three commitments we would make the government agrees that the defendant would be entitled to counsel of choice, but they don't agree as to the appellate issue, but that's where it breaks down.

That being said, the defendant could also retain someone else if that was his choosing, and that's what the Sixth Amendment says, he has a right to counsel of choice if he has the funds to hire counsel of choice.

And that's the issue that we're here litigating is whether or not he is going to have the funds to hire counsel of choice, which is his right under the Sixth Amendment if he has the funds. There's no dispute that the funds were untainted, the funds were held for a potential fine and potential restitution.

It's my understanding of the 92 people that the government has called known victims, that the vast majority of them opt out of being notified, which I would speculate as to the reasons, that they don't want to relive this type of thing over and over. So there's certain people that just don't want to receive notice and just won't participate.

The government can correct me if I'm wrong, but I believe that there are 19 of the 92 that actually opt to receive notice. There are 14 that I understand so far that have made a claim out of that 19. So the number is not going to be near where the government believes it's going to be.

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The government also alluded to the PSR report having been prepared a long time ago. Had that sentencing gone forward the 60 days where additional victims could make a claim for restitution is also long past. So the likelihood of there being any significant additional victims making claims to restitution is very low.

So if we see that to the logical conclusion, at the end of a sentencing, even if the Court were to impose a fine of 500,000, the restitution as to the 14 people, wait the 60 days and a couple of more people make their claim for restitution, the defendant is going to be getting a significant amount of money returned to him, but he will have been deprived of his right to counsel of choice at the very important stages of the proceeding.

And that's the problem that we have with this, your Honor. We do believe that it is, as a result, both a Fifth and Sixth Amendment violation.

I understand the Court's position that the Luis case applies pretrial, but I would submit to the Court that I don't believe it precludes -- or the analysis would be different for the period of time between the entry of a plea and prior to a sentencing.

He hasn't been convicted, but obviously it's not pretrial because he's waived his right to a trial, it's the period in between. And I still believe that the case law

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would be applicable because we're dealing with untainted
funds, and we're still dealing with the right to counsel for
the very important stage of proceedings for both the potential
motion to withdraw the guilty plea and a sentencing.
              So I do believe that the analysis in the Luis
case is still applicable, and I just fear that it would be
error at this point when ultimately, at the end of the day,
money is going to be returned to the defendant in all
likelihood, for him not to be able to have his counsel of
choice, and then, when it's too late, to get a check sent back
to him from the district court clerk's office.
                          So the government represented that
              THE COURT:
if it was 175,000 being sought just for attorney's fees, that
that would be the equivalent at a payment of $125 per hour of
1400 hours of work by counsel. But you explained that it's
actually only $125,000 for attorney's fees.
              MR. SCHONFELD: Yes, your Honor.
                          The other 50 is actually for costs.
              THE COURT:
              MR. SCHONFELD: Yes, your Honor.
              THE COURT: So that 125,000, at one twenty-five
per hour would be how much?
              MS. ROOHANI: One thousand hours.
              MR. SCHONFELD: Your Honor, I know the Court is
aware -- maybe not aware, but, your Honor, we do not do CJA
panel appointed work so we don't do cases for $125 an hour.
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We do our share of pro bono cases, but this is not a case that
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     we're accepting on a pro bono basis. So I think --
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                   THE COURT:
                               I'm not setting your fee, I just
     need to hear reasonableness evaluation --
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                   MR. SCHONFELD: Yes, your Honor.
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                   THE COURT: -- to see whether this is --
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                   MR. SCHONFELD: You know, I get in state court
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     they have --
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                   THE COURT: -- or not just an attempt by
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     Mr. Fuechtener to sort of claw back some money that otherwise
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     would have been going to the victims under some kind of ruse
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     that he's going to be using it for an attorney --
                   MR. SCHONFELD: Well, I can --
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                   THE COURT: -- but could not reasonably be doing
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     so.
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                   MR. SCHONFELD: I can tell your Honor that if it
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     is me and Mr. Chesnoff, the $125,000 would be a flat fee
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     engagement that would be earned upon receipt, and we would do
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     the work that we are hired to do.
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                   We would not be giving it to Mr. Fuechtener to
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     spend as he pleases. The 50,000 would be maintained in our
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     trust account, would be used for direct costs associated with
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     those proceedings.
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                   That being said, if the Court were to order that
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     the money is released to us, Mr. Fuechtener could then say
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that he wants to hire someone else, and obviously, you know,
we would respect that, but then we wouldn't have control as
to, you know, how the funds -- presumably we would transfer
the funds to whomever he hires trust account, and whatever the
court order that exists as a result of this hearing would go
to that lawyer as well.
              So if it is, you know, specific that it is only
to be applied to, you know, A, B, and C, then that lawyer
would have to comply with that order.
              But if it is our firm, the one twenty-five would
be earned upon receipt, and we would go to work to set out to
do the things that we've described here, and so it would not
be returned to Mr. Fuechtener.
              The only caveat is what I just stated, that if
he hired someone else, we would send it to their trust
account.
              THE COURT: All right. So if we're looking at
1,000 hours at one twenty-five per hour, previously the
government said that it would have been six months worth of
time if it was 1400, but now we know it's 1,000 hours so --
              MS. ROOHANI:
                            I'm going to attempt to do the
math, your Honor, if you give me just a moment.
              THE COURT: All right. But that would include
appeal you're saying.
              MR. SCHONFELD: Yes, your Honor, it would.
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THE COURT: All right. So it doesn't mean that
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     you would be asking for a continuance of whatever time that --
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                   MR. SCHONFELD: I would not be asking for a
     five- or six-month continuance.
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                                      I would obviously request a
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     continuance so that we could adequately prepare and be
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     effective counsel, but it would not be a five- or six-month
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     continuance that we would be seeking.
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                   MS. ROOHANI: Your Honor, at a thousand hours,
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     assuming that they worked 40 hours a week on this case alone,
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     that would be 25 weeks worth of work. That's assuming eight
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     hours a day. Mr. Smith's math assumed 175 days of legal work
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     at eight hours day.
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                   THE COURT: All right. So Mr. Fuechtener, are
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     you able to follow everything that we're discussing here?
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                   It sounds like Mr. Schonfeld and the
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     government's attorney, Ms. Roohani, have been trying to figure
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     out a way to assist you without jeopardizing the funds that
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     are available for the victims.
                   And the smallest amount of money that I've heard
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     so far is that $125,000 is needed for Mr. Schonfeld to
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     represent you, or some other attorney to represent you, with
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     $50,000 set aside for costs, for a total of $175,000.
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                   THE DEFENDANT: Yes, I understand that.
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                   THE COURT: And do you understand that if I
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     release that amount, the $175,000, I do not put any strings on
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that, you can use it to hire an attorney for 10,000, and pay
the costs of a hundred and whatever else, but once I carve out
this amount, you don't have to spend any of it if you don't
want to, but I think that you need to be aware that you're not
required to hire Mr. Schonfeld. You have that option, or you
can hire someone else, or stay with Ms. Connolly or --
              THE DEFENDANT: Yes, I know that. That's what
Judge Hoffman explained to me in one of the past hearings.
              MS. ROOHANI: Your Honor, I have one more
concern that I need to put on the record.
              THE COURT: Yes, Ms. Roohani.
              MS. ROOHANI: Is that Mr. Chesnoff and Schonfeld
will be the eighth and ninth attorneys on this case.
              THE COURT: Yeah, we're going to run out of
criminal defense attorneys in town.
              MS. ROOHANI: He's running out of them, and
you're a hundred percent correct, your Honor.
              My concern is this, your Honor, is that if you
give this money to him no strings attached, he's going to come
back to you in two months after he's dissipated this $175,000
and say he needs another $175,000 based on the Sixth
Amendment. So I would ask that if you're going to release
this money --
              THE COURT: But that wouldn't be reasonable.
That's what we're looking at here is what is a reasonable
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amount of money that he would need to hire counsel.

2.2

MS. ROOHANI: And I would ask one of two things, your Honor, is if you determine that the total amount that's reasonable for any attorney is \$175,000, then let that be the total that he gets to spend regardless of whether he wants to hire this law firm or ten other attorneys or whatever it might be, because then that inters his Sixth Amendment right to counsel, and then the Circuit won't have an issue with it.

Alternatively, if it's the amount that -whatever the reasonableness amount is, then that work should
have to be transferred over to the next set of attorneys
ultimately if it comes down to that.

My concern is, is he's going to come back here in two months and ask for more money, and then two months after that and ask for more money, and then the victims are going to be left with zero dollars at the end of it.

And I don't think he has a right to the release of money just because he wants the money released. I think it has to be tethered to that Sixth Amendment right, and I would ask that the order be limited to his ability to pay for the motion to withdraw for the purposes of sentencing and only for attorney's fees and then costs.

THE COURT: Mr. Schonfeld, what is your position on that?

MR. SCHONFELD: Well, your Honor, my position is

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that Mr. Chesnoff and I are unwilling to do the case unless we are being retained for the appeal, and I've stated the reasons for that.

I'm just not going to be committed to the

District Court and the Court of Appeals and the defendant to

pursue an appeal which would be my legal and ethical

obligation if I'm not retained to do that.

So if that's going to be the order, then

Mr. Fuechtener can set out to hire other counsel of choice

with the funds that the Court releases, but we would be

unwilling to have it limited to being retained for a potential

motion to withdraw guilty plea and sentencing only.

THE COURT: All right. Ms. Roohani, I forgot to ask you, and I had written down here, that the defense has said that there's only 19 of the 93 victims who have requested notification, or is it the opposite, that they have requested not to be notified?

MS. ROOHANI: Your Honor, it's not an issue of the request not to be notified, is they might not be seeking restitution at this time.

As you know, they have to update their medical records as time goes on. Some of them may have opted out, but they could change their mind between now and the time of sentencing.

It's sort of one of these situations where I

2.2

know 92 have been identified, that means we know who they are, we know that we have contact information for them, we know that they're real human beings.

At some point in the past they've sought restitution so we have some type of contact information, and it's our office's practice to send out notification to all of those individuals unless they affirmatively opt out, and I don't have a number for you on that, your Honor.

I can tell you that as it's set forth in the PSR this is an unprecedented number of victims, and I know that they continue to trickle in.

So I understand that this case has been pending for some time, but it's been continued because Mr. Fuechtener wants to continue to litigate little things along the way, and as he does that, more victims continue to show up.

And so I'm not comfortable with limiting that in some way, as you can understand, because in the end, if he continues to litigate this until 2022 or whatever, there might be 92 victims who show up at that point, and that's a risk that he takes by continuing to push out sentencing.

And I'll just make clear, your Honor, because perhaps he doesn't understand this, is if they don't get the money from this plea agreement, they have indicated to me that they will come after him civilly.

So I don't think that this is a situation where

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     limiting this in some way is going to enure his benefit, and
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     it's potentially going to harm him more long term.
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                   THE COURT: Well, I think it bears repeating
     that in the plea agreement the $5,000 per victim is actually
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     very favorable to the defendant because, in fact, this is
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     mandatory restitution that the Court does not have the
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     discretion to deny, it has to impose restitution.
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                   And what the statutes, the sentencing statutes
 9
     provide for is that the Court provide restitution in the
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     amount that is -- let me see if I can find this here -- well,
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     Ms. Roohani, do you have -- I just saw this this weekend when
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     I was looking at it again, but it's for all of the losses.
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                   MS. ROOHANI: Correct, your Honor, all losses,
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     physical, mental, emotional, psychological, that can be
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     attributed to the defendant, and, as your Honor knows from
16
     looking at these in past cases there's --
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                   THE COURT:
                               Hundreds of thousands of dollars.
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                   MS. ROOHANI: Per victim, yes, your Honor.
19
                   THE COURT: Per victim that is requested, much
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     more than what you're looking at here.
21
                   So sometimes it's one of those
2.2
     be-careful-what-you-ask-for situations because this number is
23
     actually quite small compared to what we've had in other
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     cases, and what could be seen if this agreement is undone.
25
                   But -- all right. So I do agree that the Luis
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case does not apply to this particular situation inasmuch as it is not a pretrial case whereas Luis was a pretrial case.

These, are as much as my understanding, and I even looked at that because I wasn't really sure if these were tainted or untainted because there were upwards of, what, 8, 9, 11 electrical devices at that home.

MS. ROOHANI: There was 9 with child pornography, 43 total devices, your Honor.

and -- in closets and such, and there was not just child pornography, but also -- what is it, those listening devices that you plug into the electronics in order to live chat and view and -- almost seemed to me like perhaps it would be easy for the government, if they wanted to, make an argument that this property was tainted because there was so much child pornography being seen and requested and -- in this home.

There was explanations of parties, multiple parties going on. Again, I think that it's another situation, you need to be careful what you're asking for because I think that the government was being more than reasonable in agreeing that it's untainted and only asking for \$5,000 per victim.

As to the postconviction relief, the 2255 we know, because I write this all the time in the orders that the Court provides, there is no right to counsel in the 2255s.

And in the direct appeals, we do provide counsel

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when someone is indigent and cannot afford counsel, but we certainly do not provide them with counsel of their choice, they don't get to pick and choose. We appoint their counsel for them.

The amount that's being requested for motion and sentencing would not be reasonable, quite frankly, but if you include the appeal, I think that the \$125,000 for attorney costs, plus \$50,000 for other costs, for example, forensic examinations of devices or private investigators to interview people, things of that nature, that amount does seem reasonable to me.

And, again, one twenty-five per hour is obviously not what most private practitioners in the criminal defense field charge. Usually it is a flat fee of a certain amount, and there's not even hours really that are kept except for any -- internally for any dispute reasons. But a case with this much discovery, that would be certainly reasonable at this point.

So I'm going to go ahead and release,

Mr. Fuechtener, the \$125,000 for counsel and \$50,000 for

costs, and they are to be used only for counsel and costs. So

if you change your mind and you decide, as you have in the

past, that this attorney, whether it's attorney number eight

or nine or ten, or whatever, you decide now all of a sudden

you don't want this one and you want another one, then you

can't come back and ask for more money. That's it.

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We're not going to claw away at all of this money bit by bit, 125,000 at a time, every month coming in here asking for a new attorney.

Now, that being said, if you decide you don't want Schonfeld, you want Connolly instead, or you want to go back to Marchese, or you want someone else that I don't even know yet, you can use it for a different attorney, but you can't use it for anything else than an attorney, the one twenty-five, and same with the fifty, can only be used for costs for purposes of reviewing what needs to be reviewed and researching and drafting and arguing the motion and sentencing.

MR. SCHONFELD: Your Honor, just so that part of the motion is clear, there may be some experts for purposes of sentencing as well.

THE COURT: That's reasonable to expect as well, and that's included in the \$50,000.

MS. ROOHANI: Your Honor, does that amount also include appeal? Because I think that that is a defining -- it's a question I'm sure that Mr. Schonfeld is going to want the answer to.

THE COURT: Yes, it does include the appeal.

It's a flat fee, and so if that's what they're charging for the appeal, and that includes the appeal.

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I don't think that there is a right to counsel of choice for the appeal, however, I am willing to provide the full amount that's requested at 125,000 for counsel and 50,000 for costs, and that is to include appeal. Like I said, otherwise I don't think that motion and sentencing -- 125,000 would not be reasonable for just the motion and sentencing, so that's why I am releasing that 125,000 for counsel and fifty for costs because I agree that it would be a reasonable amount when you include appeal. But I'm not certainly saying that in every case I'm going to be releasing funds for appeal because I really don't believe that there is a right to counsel of choice on a direct appeal. His is a package, I guess I should say, maybe sort of a unique situation with private counsel, but not uncommon in this district for private counsel to be retained at a flat fee naming services as a point as opposed to an hourly fee for amount of time. So that being said, our current sentencing date, Aaron, is 23 --MS. ROOHANI: It's in November, your Honor. THE COURT: 14th. There is one stating November 14th. Can we keep that date, or are you going to -you don't have to tell me right now.

continue the date, and, if so, then, do you want me to rule on

Are we going to be filing a stipulation to

2.2

the pending motion, or are you going to withdraw the motion?

And you can think about this. I don't want to put you on -
I'm just trying for my purposes because we have a couple of

trials coming up, and I'm trying to figure out --

MR. SCHONFELD: Your Honor, I do not believe that whether it's my office representing Mr. Fuechtener or another attorney, that they would be prepared for sentencing on November 14th.

I also understand that it is Mr. Fuechtener's request that that date be continued so that he can secure his counsel of choice who can, you know, assess whether or not to file a motion to withdraw, supplement the motion to withdraw, address the issues that may need to be addressed, and then also potentially go forward with the sentencing.

So I think what I would propose, your Honor, is either leave that date as it is for now and have like a two-week status check for substitution of counsel.

Mr. Fuechtener can by then make a decision whether it's going to be my office that's going to be representing him going forward or someone else representing him going forward.

I'm not sure what the Court wants to do as far as release of the funds, whether it would be maintained in my trust account until that election is made, or whether the Court just wants to maintain it still with the clerk's office until that election is made, and then it can go to whichever

attorney is taking on the representation.

2.2

But that would be my request, that we have a two-week window where the defendant can confirm who his counsel will be, and then at that point figure out scheduling for the sentencing.

THE COURT: All right. So motion 296, which is a motion for reconsideration regarding order 295, is, I guess, granted in part and denied in part because I am granting a release of some funds, although not all the funds, and I think that the order that was being requested to be reconsidered also addressed issues that we're not reconsidering.

So I'll just say that it's granted in part, denied in part, and the part that is granted is that \$125,000 for counsel fees and \$50,000 for costs are to be released.

We'll go ahead and set a two-week status check and ask first to Mr. Fuechtener, along with whatever counsel he decides to use, to file something on the docket, some kind of notice to explain who it is that he wants the funds to be deposited with, so some kind of notice of appearance by counsel or notice of retention by counsel.

I don't need to know the details of the retention, but so long as there's something that's signed by Mr. Fuechtener that directs the moneys can go to some attorney's trust fund, whether it's this attorney or a different attorney.

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So while I'm agreeing to release the funds, they're not going to be released today, they're not going to be released until there's some notice on the record of who is being elected as counsel.

If you file that today, then I'll release the money today. If you file it tomorrow, I'll release it tomorrow, but you have two weeks at the very least. If you need more time, ask for more time, and we'll give you more time, but I don't want to lose track of this.

So you decide who you want. If you want

Mr. Schonfeld, then a notice is filed that you sign saying I

am electing to retain Mr. Schonfeld, I'm asking the Court go

ahead and deposit the money in Mr. Schonfeld's account.

If you decide to go with somebody else, same thing, I am electing to retain somebody else, tell me who it is, and that you want the funds to be deposited in the account of that person, and then the funds will be released to that person.

MS. ROOHANI: And, your Honor, I'm attempting to figure this out because I'm actually out of the district in two weeks, and I have been having difficulties sometimes finding people to come and cover the hearings.

So I spoke with Mr. Schonfeld, and he believes that this might be reasonable, is to have whoever that Mr. Fuechtener elects to represent him file a fee agreement or

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     something like that under seal with your Honor, and then
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     you'll know for sure who's going to be representing him.
 3
                   If it's Mr. Schonfeld, he can file that, and
 4
     then the money can be released to him. If it's somebody else,
 5
     then the money can be released to that law firm's trust
 6
     account directly, and then we could potentially just vacate
 7
     the hearing, because it would be clear to your Honor who
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     ultimately would be representing him, and then we might not
 9
     need to waste time coming back here again if your Honor is
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     inclined to do that.
11
                   THE COURT: Right. But what if he doesn't --
12
     what if things get complicated as we know tend to happen in
13
     this case more often than not?
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                   MS. ROOHANI: And, your Honor, and if that's the
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     case, then I would just ask for three weeks because I'm
16
     actually not -- I would prefer to be here myself for these
17
     hearings, and unfortunately I'm out of the district on the
18
     23rd, and so I would ask that we set it for the week of the
19
     29th at any point.
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                   THE COURT: All right. How about Tuesday, the
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     30th?
2.2
                   MS. ROOHANI:
                                 I'm available all day, thank you,
23
     your Honor.
                               Aaron is that --
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                   THE COURT:
25
                               That will be the second day of trial
                   THE CLERK:
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1
     your Honor.
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                   THE COURT: Okay. I was going to say that
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     doesn't look good so -- okay. Shall we go back? You won't be
     on the 26th -- well, the 26th is actually Nevada Day so some
 4
 5
    people are not going to be here because their kids will be out
 6
     of school.
 7
                   MS. ROOHANI: And, your Honor, I'm actually out
 8
     of the district from the 21st of August -- August -- October,
 9
     your Honor, until the 27th, so that whole week I'm out.
10
                   And, your Honor, if it's easier for that to
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     work, I will make arrangements for somebody to be here.
12
     just my preference that I be here myself.
13
                   THE COURT:
                               Well, Aaron, let's go ahead and --
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     what time would a bathroom break be for the trial, like,
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     10:30?
16
                   THE CLERK: Your Honor, I was actually going to
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     recommend perhaps Thursday morning, September 1st --
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     September -- November 1st at 9:00 a.m., and then that way we
     can have just a slightly later start time with trial.
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                   THE COURT: Don't we have -- at 11:00 a.m. we
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     have something, too?
2.2
                   THE CLERK:
                               Those two I'm going to end up
23
    pushing to another date.
24
                   THE COURT: Oh, okay. All right.
                                                      Then let's do
25
     that. Okay. How about Thursday, November 1st, at what time,
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1
     Aaron?
 2
                   THE CLERK:
                               9:00 a.m., your Honor.
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                   THE COURT:
                               Okay. So is everyone available
     Thursday, November 1st, at 9:00 a.m.?
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 5
                   MR. SCHONFELD: Yes, your Honor.
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                   MS. ROOHANI: Yes, your Honor.
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                   THE COURT: We'll go ahead and plan to have a
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     status check on that date which can be vacated if the
 9
     appropriate documentation is filed prior to that date.
10
                   Mr. Schonfeld, do you have any objection to
11
     filing an fee agreement under seal? I wasn't going to ask for
12
     one, but --
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                   MR. SCHONFELD: Your Honor, I spoke to my
14
     client, and he doesn't have an opposition to that.
15
                   THE COURT: Okay. So we'll go ahead and have a
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     notice that is visible that is not sealed that has him
17
     electing who it is that he is retaining.
18
                   If he wants more than one person, obviously,
19
     they're just going to have to split the money more ways, and
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     that he agrees that the money should be deposited in the
21
     account, the trust account for those folks and then everything
2.2
     else can be sealed.
23
                                   Thank you, your Honor.
                   MR. SCHONFELD:
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                   THE COURT: Anything else, Ms. Roohani?
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                   MS. ROOHANI: No, your Honor, thank you.
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                   And I will work together with whoever ultimately
 2
     ends up getting on this case and trying to set a sentencing
 3
     date that's reasonable.
 4
                   THE COURT: All right.
                                           Thank you.
                   And so that means also that whoever it is that
 5
 6
     ends up on this case, whether it's the same folks or different
 7
     folks, someone is going to need to file a stip to continue the
 8
     sentencing date which is currently for November 14th, if, in
 9
     fact, no one can be ready by the 14th.
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                   And then the motion -- let me see what I was
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                  The other motion that is still pending is -- do
     looking at.
12
     you have it, Aaron? I had it and --
13
                   THE CLERK: Yes, your Honor, number 282 is the
14
     motion to withdraw plea, and number 283 is the motion to
15
     strike the motion to withdraw plea.
16
                   THE COURT: All right. So motion 282 and 283
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     are still currently scheduled to be heard on November 14th.
18
     So if you want to supplement it or withdraw it, you need to
19
     figure out what you're going to have to do.
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                   MR. SCHONFELD: Or presumably we could include
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     that in the stipulation to continue the sentencing.
2.2
                   THE COURT:
                               That would be wise if you could do
23
     that.
24
                   MS. ROOHANI: Will do, your Honor.
25
                   THE COURT: All right.
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